ABSTRACT Smart contracts on blockchain systems implement business logic and directly handle important assets. Although smart contracts play these critical roles, it is hard for users interacting with the system to understand the real behavior of the deployed bytecodes of smart contracts. The quirks of smart contracts, such as code reuse and limited unique datasets, make it challenging to recognize the functional details of smart contracts. In this paper, we propose a new method for characterizing bytecode-only smart contracts by automatically assigning multiple attribute tags. Using a deep learning approach, our system, the ScanAT, extracts attribute tags from the source code and metadata of known smart contracts and trains their bytecode with the attribute tags. The ScanAT then infers attribute tags from the bytecode of smart contracts alone. Our experiments show that ScanAT can achieve 81% accuracy in predicting attribute tags, using convolutional neural networks and a customized autoencoder.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the development of blockchain technology has provided new opportunities to build trustless services on top of the Internet. At the core of blockchain, smart contracts play important roles in realizing the sophisticated logic of the blockchain services. A smart contract is just a program on a blockchain system but it can act as a mediator between participants as well as an operator of services, so it maintains very valuable assets and their information. There are several, slightly different but functionally equivalent, models of smart contracts, depending upon the blockchain system used (e.g., Ethereum [1] , and EoS [2] ).
Identifying the behavior of smart contracts is critical to both service providers and users. Maliciously organized blockchain services can illegally capture users' assets. Bartoletti et al. reported that Ponzi schemes operated in Bitcoin gathered more than seven million USD in the period from September 2013 to September 2014 [3] . Maliciously forged smart contracts such as honeypots, are still stealing participants'assets [4] , [5] . Additionally, the unintentional The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiafeng Xie. misbehavior of legitimate smart contracts also lead to disastrous economic losses. The smart contract involved in the Parity Multisig wallet hack [6] unintentionally caused severe damage to the multisig wallet owners.
However, in spite of the risks posed by smart contracts in real use, recognizing the behavior of the smart contract is hard. The deployed smart contracts with which users are interacting are in a binary (bytecode) form. Thus, we need sophisticated reverse engineering and program analysis techniques, such as decompilation or abstract interpretation, to analyze the bytecode of smart contracts. Although we can obtain the source code of smart contracts, reviewing smart contracts using the unfamiliar execution model of blockchains is not easy for normal users.
In this paper, we propose a new method, ScanAT, for recognizing the behavior of a smart contract by revealing its traits, which we denote ''attribute tags.'' We extracted representative attribute tags from a dataset of smart contract codes and then trained a neural network with the bytecode and corresponding attributes of smart contracts. The trained neural network can infer attribute tags for unknown smart contracts. ScanAT automatically describes bytecode-only smart contracts using 16 attribute tags. Our experimental results VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
show that ScanAT can discover attribute tags with more than 81% accuracy. For example, a Decentralized Application (DApp) called ''BlockchainCuties'' is a blockchain game application where the aim of the game is to collect creatures [7] . It also supports trading of creatures between users. To understand the behavior of the DApp before sending actual money, a user can find source code that is matched to the deployed bytecodes of the DApp addresses and then inspect them. However, even though one can access the source code, the DApp consists of 11 smart contracts with more than 5540 lines of Solidity codes. For a non-technical user, inspecting the whole codebase is a daunting job. ScanAT can infer the following attribute tags from the bytecodes of BlockchainCuties: crowdsale, destroy, remove, lock, mint, own, pause, trade, transfer, upgrade, and withdraw. One can understand the actual features implemented in the smart contracts from the inferred attribute tags. First, the DApp has basic token interfaces, such as ERC20 or ERC721, since it has transfer, withdraw, and mint attribute tags. Second, it receives the funds from users (crowdsale) and supports exchanging tokens (trade). Third, it has management functions, such as ownership management (own), time lock (lock) and membership management (remove). Finally, it handles the lifetime of DApp by upgrading (upgrade) and self-destructing (destroy). Since the attribute tags accurately abstract important features, even a non-technical user can quickly grasp the real behavior of the DApp from only the deployed bytecode.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II describes related work, including the identification of unknown smart contracts and multi-label learning with neural networks. In Section III, we present the motivation for attribute tagging of smart contracts and the challenges involved in analyzing bytecode. The design of our system is explained in Section IV, and the system is evaluated in Section V. Section V presents case studies of inferred attributes. The paper concludes in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK A. IDENTIFICATION OF UNKNOWN SMART CONTRACTS
In order to characterize unknown smart contracts, Novill et al. have applied a clustering approach to the bytecode of smart contracts [8] . They converted the bytecode to fuzzy hash values using ssdeep hash [9] , and then calculated the distance between the hash value by averaging Damerau-Levenshtein, Jaccard, and Sorensen-Dice distances [10] . The smart contracts were clustered into seven and 142 clusters by two unsupervised learning algorithm, K -medoids and Affinity Propagation, respectively. Their algorithm can group similar smart contracts but cannot describe the characteristics of smart contracts. Additional manual inspection of each group must be carried out in order to identify the attributes. ScanAT provides a fully automated method for identifying the characteristics using multiple attribute tags.
B. MULTI-LABEL LEARNING WITH NEURAL NETWORKS
To understand unstructured data such as images, several classification approaches have been proposed. Traditionally, supervised learning algorithms assign a single label to data [11] . However, describing data with a single label is difficult since a single label does not present all of the details of data. Thus, models which support multiple labels have been developed. Machine learning (ML) approaches, such as ClassifierChain [12] , ML-kNN [13] , ML-c4.5 [14] and ensemble algorithms such as RAkELd and RAkELo [15] , have been used to assign multiple labels with structured features. For the multi-labeling of unstructured data, deep learning approaches can be applied and pairwise ranking loss functions can be used to pursue multiple goals such as applying multiple labels.
Zhang and Zhou [16] proposed the Backpropagation for Multi Label Learning (BP-MLL) loss function to optimize the backpropagation of neural networks. They applied BP-MLL to feed-forward neural networks (FFNNs) with a hidden layer. Weston et al. [17] and Ioffe et al. [18] developed the Weighted Approximate Ranking Pairwise (WARP) loss function for convolutional neural networks (CNNs). By applying sampling to loss functions, WARP approaches improves performance, and has smaller memory usage than conventional approaches. However, WARP still has hinged curves, which diminishes layer effects. Thus, Li et al. [19] proposed a Log-Sum-Exp Pairwise (LSEP) loss function. The LSEP function removes non-smooth change and uses negative sampling to achieve improved stability and scalability over BP-MLL and WARP.
III. MOTIVATIONS AND CHALLENGES

A. MOTIVATIONS
Although smart contracts guarantee that the code is executed as written, they can still be misused in numerous ways. Smart contracts that are not carefully written may give funds to unauthorized addresses or lock funds unintentionally [20] . Attackers may deceive users with sophisticated, carefully crafted smart contracts. For example, the Underhanded Solidity Coding Contest [5] showed how smart contracts for crowd funding (Initial Coin Offering) can deceive users with their unfair settlement structures.
However, verifying the behavior of smart contracts is challenging. First, the deployed smart contracts are in the form of machine-readable bytecode. EtherScan [21] provides source code of deployed bytecode, but the number of entries is quite low (54,209) compared to the total number of smart contracts (11, 238, 987) , so the source code of only a limited number of smart contracts can be investigated. Even if we have the verified source code of smart contract, non-technical users have trouble understanding the behavior of smart contracts. Last but not least, most developers are relatively unfamiliar with the execution model of smart contracts. To avoid the common pitfalls of smart contracts, they still need to identify the behavior of other smart contracts that may interact with their smart contracts. Hence, features used to identify differences should be carefully selected from the limited variable parts of smart contracts. Our approach: We employ a deep learning method to automatically discover attributes from the bytecode of smart contracts. To overcome the challenges discussed above, we first built an attribute reference set. We derived representative words from the source code of deployed smart contracts. We used the Verified Smart Contracts on EtherScan [21] as a set of confirmed source code of the smart contracts deployed in Ethereum. We called the derived tags ''attribute tags,'' due to the bytecode peculiarities, we apply two different bytecode feature engineering. We trained our neural network model with the attribute tags extracted from the source code and its bytecode. We also trained and used an encoder to highlight distinctive parts in raw bytecode. Our trained model can automatically select appropriate attribute tags for unknown bytecode of a smart contract. The attribute tags are the clues for discovering the kinds as well as the characteristics of smart contracts.
IV. DESIGN
In this section, we describe the design of our system ScanAT and answer the following questions: Since the features from the two models have different characteristics, we use convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and feed-forward neural networks (FFNNs), respectively. 5) (Inference stage) Identify attribute tags for unknown smart contracts. Using the trained model, ScanAT automatically finds suitable attribute tags for the bytecode of unknown smart contracts.
B. EXTRACTING TAGS
Tag extraction is the process of extracting keyword tags from smart contract source code. It used in building reference attribute tags as well as constructing source code features. The tags are normalized keywords in titles taken from metadata provided by EtherScan and source code. We extract tags through a tokenizing and cleaning process.
1) TOKENIZING
Every identifiable word in a title and the source code is a candidate tag. We extracted all the words via tokenization using regular expressions. Composite words in the form of camelCase, PascalCase, and snake_case were also individually identified word by word.
2) CLEANING
The extracted tokens from the source code contained unclear words, such as stop words which are too common, VOLUME 7, 2019 abbreviations, typographical errors, and symbols. We first eliminated stop words from the candidate tag set. We also removed numbers since they provide very little information. We then converted tags into normalized forms by fixing general typographical errors, minimizing the variations of abbreviations (for example, unifying ''ether'' and ''eth'' into ''eth''), removing morphological affixes, a process known as stemming [22] , and binding synonyms of tags.
C. BUILDING REFERENCE ATTRIBUTES
We built a set of reference attribute tags to describe the characteristics of smart contracts. Our dataset for training was the source code of the verified smart contracts in EtherScan [21] . To filter out uninterpretable smart contracts, we compiled each source code using the Solidity 0.4.24 compiler and kept compilable smart contracts only, resulting in 32,650 examples. We extracted 18,557 tags from the source code. We retained 193 tags in first quartile (25%) of frequency from 773 tags filtered by the mean of frequency. The requirements for attribute tags were: (1) representativeness and (2) expressivity. It is desirable for the attribute tags to tell us the base group of a DApp as well as identifying specific behaviors. We referred to the OpenZeppelin Library [23] for the identification of keywords that satisfy these requirements. OpenZeppelin is composed of prebuilt smart contract codes for common use cases, such as tokens and payment, as well as primitive math operations. We excluded the tags not shown in the library code, and retained the tags related to the main entities of blockchain systems: (1) account, (2) contract, and (3) token. TABLE 1 shows the attribute tags used in this work.
D. SMART CONTRACT FEATURE ENGINEERING
We extracted tags as described in §IV-B from the source code of smart contracts and excluded all of the tags except the attribute tags (IV-C). We then converted the attribute tags into a vector using One-Hot encoding. The features of smart contract bytecodes are constructed in two ways in order to extract smart contract specific information.
1) RAW BYTECODE FEATURES
Since neural network models are well adapted to image processing, we processed the normalized opcode sets as twodimensional data, like images. We reshaped the normalized opcodes of a smart contract to an 128 × 128 matrix and 98672 VOLUME 7, 2019 provided the matrix to the neural network in the form of a gray-scale image. With this approach, we expected that the autoencoder would highlight the variable part of each smart contract after training.
2) HANDCRAFTED FEATURES
We also created handcrafted features from the opcodes of bytecode. We extracted the instructions from the disassembled bytecode, including opcodes and operands, and removed the parameters in instructions, such as numbers in PUSH4, DUP3. We then encoded all operands to OPERAND like opcodes for unification. We extracted three features from the normalized opcode sets: length, opcode components, and vectorized context. The length parameter consists of three types of information: the number of opcodes in a program; the number of unique opcodes in a program; and the length of the bytecode. We represented these data as a three-dimensional vector. For the opcode components, we created a vector in which each element corresponds to a unique opcode. The vector, which had 73 dimensions, shows the kinds of opcodes from which a smart contract is constructed. We used the doc2vec model [24] to extract the context information of the opcodes. The set of normalized opcodes from a smart contract was converted to a 24-dimensional vector. Finally, each feature was rescaled to the Gaussian distribution in order to data standardization.
E. TRAINING
Both kinds of smart contract features discussed in §IV-D are associated with the attribute tags. However, we used different models when training the attribute-tagged features.
1) CNN WITH AUTOENCODER FOR RAW BYTECODES a: AUTOENCODER
As we discussed in §III-B, the restrictions on the variability and size of smart contracts are obstacles to the use of deep neural networks in training. To overcome these limitations, we applied the autoencoder approach on the dataset of the two-dimensional raw bytecodes. We used the Stacked Convolutional Denoising autoencoder (SCDAE) [25] . It is customized, as part of data preprocessing, to downsize twodimensional raw bytecodes. Because of its non-deterministic method, it has to optimize a model with low uncertainty. The hierarchically downsizing, denoising, and convolutional structure of SCDAE are useful for learning about our dataset. The autoencoder is unsupervised, and thus the training dataset for the autoencoder is not limited to the verified smart contracts. We trained the autoencoder with 2,227,842 bytecodes downloaded from the latest million blocks of Ethereum public full nodes. After training the autoencoder, we applied it to our raw bytecode features. Using the autoencoder, an 128×128× 1 image of a smart contract is converted into a 32 × 32 × 1 image. Thus, the dataset is less noisy and is smaller, and therefore more suited to further processing.
b: CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORKS
Macro-architectures of the CNNs such as AlexNet [26] , VGGNet [27] , and ResNet [28] , can be limited to single label learning. However, we extended one of the macroarchitectures for multiple labels, our attribute tags. Each label has its own feasibility, which is defined as a confidence score created using the logistic sigmoid function [29] . The loss function was also adjusted to a pairwise ranking loss function for the multi-label image annotation task such as NUSWIDE [30] . In particular, we used the LSEP loss function ( §II) because other pairwise ranking loss functions, such as BP-MLL [16] and WARP [17] , [18] , have non-smooth characteristics, limiting parameters estimation. In composing the CNNs, we used the ResNet-18 network (ResNet with 18 layers) [28] . The output for a smart contract consisted of a confidence score between 0 to 1 for each tag. If the confidence score was higher than a set threshold, it was selected as one of the attribute tags for the smart contract.
2) FFNNS FOR THE HANDCRAFTED FEATURES
The handcrafted features from the opcodes were in the form of a one-dimensional vector. Thus, we used feed-forward neural networks (FFNNs). Each feature-length, opcode components, embedding context-was fed into a different layer at the same level. The outputs were vectors of two, 36, and 12 dimensions, respectively. The output vectors are concatenated into a 50 dimensional vector and then passed to the next layer. We also use ResNet-18 constructed with dense layers instead of convolution layers.
F. INFERRING ATTRIBUTE TAGS
For both CNNs and FFNNs the outputs was a confidence score between 0 and 1 for each attribute tag, a total of 16 confidence scores. We then filtered out the attribute tags whose confidence score was lower than the decision threshold, T . We set the default value of T as 0.5 because a biased T can negatively effect either precision or recall.
V. EVALUATION A. DATASET
We used two kinds of real datasets: one for the attribute tags and the other for the autoencoder. To train the attribute tags, we needed the source code of smart contracts in order to extract attribute tags and build the reference set. We used 32,650 verified source code examples from EtherScan [21] . In contrast, only bytecode is needed to train the autoencoder. Thus, we could use all of the deployed Ethereum smart contracts obtainable from Google BigQuery [31] , a total of 2,227,842. Each dataset was separated into 90% for the training set to train the model, 5% for a validation set to validate the hyperparameters, and 5% for a test set to evaluate the model accuracy. 1 One of the challenges on the real dataset is the unbalanced distribution of attribute tags. When using real smart contracts, a few functions relating to token management, such as transfer, are heavily used. This leads to a biased distribution of the corresponding attribute tags, and hence skewed training results. TABLE 2 shows the distribution of the attribute tags. As shown in TABLE 2, transfer appeared in 91.97 % of smart contracts in our EtherScan source code dataset.
B. METRICS
To evaluate the accuracy of the model, we used precision, recall and F1-score. These metrics were calculated for both the macro and micro models. In the macro model, we computed the metrics for each attribute tag and then calculated the average. The equations for precision (P MA ), recall (R MA ), and F1-score (F MA ) are:
(1)
where TP i , FP i , and FN i denote the numbers of true positives, false positives, and false negatives of the i-th attribute tag, respectively. C is the total number of attribute tags. In the micro model the metrics were calculated as the average of the accuracies of all the attribute tags. As with the macro model, the precision (P MI ), recall (R MI ), and F1-score (F MI ) of the micro model were calculated, as follows:
We implemented the four neural networks using the ResNet-18 model: two CNNs with and without the autoencoder (aeCNN and CNN) and two FFNNs with different parameter sizes (1,420,625 for FFNN vs. 22,335,761 for wideFFNN). For each network, we applied the ADAM optimizer [32] with a learning rate of 0.00005 and a weight decay of 0.00005 [33] , in order to avoid overfitting. ReLU [34] was used as the activation function for all layers except for the output layer, for which we used a logistic sigmoid function [29] . The weights were initialized using Xavier normal initialization [35] , and optimized in 1000 epochs of batches of 32.
D. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experiments were designed to answer the following questions: 1) Which model is more effective for predicting attribute tags? 2) How can we handle the unbalanced distribution of attribute tags to estimate the model parameters? 3) Does the autoencoder improve performance and accuracy with our dataset? 4) Can the accuracy of FFNNs be enhanced with more parameters?
1) PERFORMANCE
The training environment was an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7400 CPU @ 3.00GHz, 8GiB DIMM Synchronous 2400 MHz (0.4 ns) × 2, GeForce RTX 2080ti. 2) ACCURACY In spite of its higher performance and shorter training time, the accuracy of the FFNNs with handcrafted features were 52.55% and 73.99% less that of the CNNs in both the macro and the micro models. To improve the accuracy, we expanded the unit size of residual block by a factor of four, increasing the number of parameters. The expanded FFNNs, denoted as wideFFNN, improved the F1-score by 66.15% for the average of the macro and micro models. This accuracy is still lower than that of the CNNs, but the handcrafted-feature approach has two benefits. First, handcrafted features are structured so that traditional machine learning approaches, such as ML-kNN [13] and ML-c4.5 [14] , can be applied without regard to data topology. Second, while raw bytecode features were not effective when the code size was wideranging, the handcrafted features were not influenced by the code size.
E. CASE STUDY AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present case studies on real DApps from the DappRadar website [36] . DappRadar classifies actively used DApps in six categories: Games, Exchanges, Collectibles, Marketplace, Gambling, and HighRisk. We obtained five topranked DApps from each category and applied ScanAT to infer the attribute tags. When a single DApp has multiple smart contracts, we aggregated the attribute tags of all smart contracts. The tree maps in FIGURE 2 show the occurrence of attribute tags for each category. We call the attribute tags with 100% occurrence, indicated by darker boxes, ''basic attributes'' for that category. Detailed information for each attribute tag is described in the Appendix.
1) CATEGORY-WISE COMPARISON
For all of the categories, three attribute tags occurred in common: transfer, withdraw, and own. In particular, the first two attributes, transfer and withdraw, are related to managing ERC20/ERC721 tokens. The attribute own covers ownership management such as transferOwnership of Ownable smart contract [23] . The token standards, such as ERC20 and ERC721, do not have strict ownership management features, but the results show that it is frequently used with tokens. One category, HighRisk, had significantly lower occurrence of the own attribute. The DappRadar groups DApps having suspicious behaviors such as pyramid or Ponzi schemes into HighRisk (e.g., PoWH3D [37] , Gandhiji.io [38] , and Dividends3d [39] ). In the results, HighRisk has the fundamental features for tokens, but it does not have widelyused ownership protection, or it has its own customized codes.
2) INTERNAL FEATURES
ScanAT can discover internal, non-public, features from bytecode. In FIGURE 3, _mint (Line 13) and _burn (Line 19) are internal functions which are not exposed in Application Binary Interfaces (ABI). However, they have typical patterns for the attributes mint and burn, which have arithmetic operations (addition at Line 4 and subtraction at Line 9) on a token storage of a mapping variable (ownedTokensCount). We found that ScanAT can correctly infer these mint and burn attribute tags regardless of the function's visibility. 
3) WHITELIST
DApps maintain a mapping table in which to store the access allowance of addresses. When ScanAT observes this pattern, it infers the existence of the whitelist. FIGURE 4 is a code excerpt from WyvernExchange.sol, where ScanAT predicts the whitelist. The mapping variable contracts (Line 3) holds a Boolean value for addresses and used as the access control condition at Line 26. It is set as true or false when the authentication for an address is granted (Line 13) or revoked (Line 7), respectively.
4) COMPOSITE ACTIONS
From the experiments, we observed that ScanAT can infer trade when a smart contract has all of the following actions: (1) Ether return (msg.value and msg.sender.transfer), (2) token transfer (arithmetic operations on a mapping variable) and (3) event emission. The latter two actions are hints for another attribute transfer, but trade is shown when the first condition is also satisfied. In FIGURE 5, bid (Line 4) calls two internal functions, _bid and _transfer. It passes msg.value to _bid, where msg.value is used in arithmetic operations and the change is returned (Line 38). In addition, _transfer transfers tokens by a calculation on mapping variables (Line 10-11) and then emits the Transfer event. Due to the composite actions, ScanAT can predict the trade attribute tag from the PandaEarth DApp. 
5) INFORMATION DELETION
The presence of code for deleting array elements is an obvious clue for the remove attribute tag. For example, deleteProposal in FIGURE 6 has delete operations (Line 17-20) on the elements indirectly accessed via self.proposal_. ScanAT successfully predicts remove in this case.
6) UPGRADABILITY
In order to overcome immutability, upgradable models for smart contracts are being proposed [40] . Developers decouple the logic part and data parts of a smart contract, and make one of them replaceable by changing the pointing address. The upgradability pattern is represented as contract separation and functional dependency. ScanAT can predict the upgrade attribute tag when this pattern is evident in the bytecode. In FIGURE 7 , the logic contract, CryptoAtomsLogic, maintains the address of the data contract, CaData (Line 30). The logic contract sets data via function calls to the data contract (Line 39-43).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents ScanAT, a system which automatically recognizes the behaviors of bytecode-only smart contracts. Even though unexpected (mis-)behaviors of smart contracts may incur severe economic losses, it is hard for non-technical users to understand their behavior. Therefore, in order to provide comprehensible information on their behaviors, we established attribute tags from a large-scale source code dataset. We employed a deep learning approach to train and infer human-readable information in the form of multiple attribute tags from the machine-readable bytecode. We also applied techniques for enhancing neural networks, such as autoencoders, to handle the challenging peculiarities of smart contracts. In this way, the aeCNN model of ScanAT achieved an accuracy of 0.8062 in macro model and 0.6482 in the micro model. The multiple attribute tags inferred by ScanAT can be used individually or collectively. An individual attribute tag gives clues as to whether a specific function or feature is acceptably implemented, but the use of collective attribute tags reveals the real category of a DApp. In future work, we will focus on the bytecode variants introduced by the different versions of the Solidity compilers.
APPENDIX PATTERNS OF ATTRIBUTE TAGS
We present the representative code for attribute tags in the Appendix. We collected the code snippets from which an attribute tag originated and the same attribute tag as predicted from its bytecode.
A. TRANSFER
The attribute transfer is generated for code that transfers a specific amount of token from one address to another address. First, it checks that the receiver's address is normal (Line 5). It then updates the balances. The sender's balance decreases by the transferring amount value (Line 7) and the same amount is added to the receiver's balance (Line 8). Finally, it notifies the token transfer using the event Transfer (Line 9).
B. BURN
ScanAT predicts burn when a smart contract reduces the total circulation of tokens. To do so, the following pattern is shown: The total circulation, totalSupply, is reduced by the eliminated amount, _value (Line 12). The same amount is also subtracted from balanceOf of msg.sender (Line 11). In addition, the code generates a Burn event.
C. MINT
Functionally the pattern that leads to the mint attribute tag is similar to burn, but the total circulation, totalSupply, increases by the amount of newly generated tokens (Line 11) as well as the target's balance (Line 10). The target is a beneficiary of minted tokens so the function has additional argument for the address.
D. WITHDRAW
The withdraw attribute tag is shown for the code to transfer Ether to an address. The pattern for withdraw consists of the condition for access control (onlyAdmin modifier in Line 6), Ether transfer (<address>.transfer() in Line 7), and an event notification (Line 8).
E. TRADE
When inferring the trade attribute tag, the following codewide pattern is shown in the code. Since the attribute is originated (extracted) from the sales of tokens or products, it handles the Ether directly and sends the earnings of the sale or the change to the transaction sender msg.sender (Line 15). As a result of the trade, the balances of tokens are updated (Lines 12-13 and Lines 24-25). The events for the transfers are followed (Line 16, 26).
F. AIRDROP
Generally, ''airdrop'' is an operation for distributing tokens to multiple recipients. ScanAT infers the airdrop attribute tag using this code pattern. The basic behavior is similar to mint, such as the increase of total circulation (Line 9). However, it has support code for multiple transfers. For example, the code uses a for loop to transfer a fixed amount of tokens to multiple addresses in the array _address (Line 22).
G. CROWDSALE
Smart contracts for crowdsale receive funds from participants until a goal is reached, and sends the funds raised to a beneficiary ( Line 9, [28] [29] [30] . If the goal is not reached, the participants withdraw their contributions (Lines 21-24). The crowdsale attribute tag is inferred for this pattern. The code receives funds and updates a mapping variable (e.g., balanceOf). It usually has a deadline, which is used as the condition for finalizing the crowd sale in the checkGoalReached and safeWithdrawal functions.
H. LOCK
The time lock is the pattern of the lock attribute tag. The lock status is maintained by Boolean variables (isLocked and isReleased in Line 11, 12) . When a lock is set, the time for lock is specified (Line 25). Depending on the process, the lock status is updated (Line 21, 29). Optionally, when releasing the lock, tokens can be transferred to a beneficiary.
I. PAUSE
The pattern for the pause attribute tag consists of a state variable and statements to check and update the variable. For example, _paused is updated in the pause (Line 4) and unpause (Line 9) functions. The modifiers are also used to check the pause status (Line 14, 19).
The freeze pattern is shown when restricting transfers to an account. The code has a mapping variable to store the account status (frozenAccount in Line 4). The status is updated in freezeAccount (Line 7) and the transfer function checks the status before transferring tokens (Line 13).
K. WHITELIST
The whitelist pattern is similar to freeze. It is also used for access control on an account (address) basis. A mapping variable stores a Boolean value for each address (whitelist in Line 5). The variable is updated by enableWallet and disableWallet (Line 11,16). However, the default behavior of whitelist is different from that of freeze: Access is granted only for selected addresses in the whitelist, while in the freeze pattern only listed address are blocked.
L. REMOVE
Obviously, the remove attribute tag is inferred from the deletion of an element in an array or a mapping variable using the delete function. In the example code, a member account is deleted from the mapping variable members (Line 4).
M. OWN
The Ownable is a well-known (library) contract for ownership management from the OpenZeppelin library. When a smart contract has similar functions to Ownable, ScanAT infers the own attribute tag. The ownership management consists of a modifier for ownership checking (Line 15), updating (Line 28), and supporting functions.
N. GAME VOLUME 7, 2019 The game attribute tag originates from the smart contracts which have the token ''game,'' but we observed that ScanAT infers game when a smart contract uses randomness based on the timestamp of latest block, now, (Line 69, 75) and it has several state variables including struct (Line 7-19).
O. UPGRADE
Upgradability is a controversial feature for smart contract. A smart contract is immutable by nature. Design patterns for upgradable smart contracts, however, have been proposed to fix bugs or to update functions [40] . Basically, they have separate logic smart contracts and data smart contracts. The main driver smart contract (logic or data) calls the other part by delegatecall to use it in the context of the calling contract. Optionally, it uses inline assembly code for unsupported features in Solidity. ScanAT infers the upgrade attribute tag for this pattern. In the example code, the Proxy contract relays function calls to the implementation function via delegatecall (Line 24). The address of the implementation is stored at the slot of the hardcoded value, IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT.
P. DESTROY
The destroy attribute tag is inferred when a smart contract uses self-destruction by using the selfdestruct function (Line 7), which was suicide in older smart contracts.
